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STUDY PROJECT

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN CONFLICT

BY

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12 FEBRUARY 1990

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THE SOUTHERN SUDAN CONFLICT

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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
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THE SOUTHERN SUDAN CONFLICT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The present situation in the Southern Sudan is an outcome of accumulated historical, political, social, cultural and administrative factors. Since independence in January 1956 and except for a few years following the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 February 1972, the southern part of the Sudan has been in turmoil.

After independence, northern Sudanese society in particular came under the influence of the Arab nationalist revival movement and later the Islamic revival. Meanwhile, some sectors of southern society were gaining an increased awareness of its African and Christian identity and a realization of how little southerners participated in public life and the extent of the decline in their standard of living. These factors remained and the intellectual and political currents from the north and south which were completely contrary to one another even became stronger.

Nimeiry, who ruled the Sudan from 1969 to 1985, put the country through an experience of Islamic laws in September 1983. The role of Christians was completely ignored, and an attempt was made to apply the Islamic law to non-Moslems in a way that was condemned by even those southerners who were close to Nimeiry and sympathetic to his policies. In April 1985 Nimeiry fell from power, and it was hoped that the rebels would throw down their arms in order to give some breathing space for discussions and agreement on the reasons for the conflict and to draw up the basis for a new era in the Sudan. But for unjustifiable reasons, the rebels continued fighting against the transitional government which was supported by all political forces in the country.

The government has suggested a constitutional conference and guarantees full protection and security for the participants. The main topics of the conference will include:

o The problem of the relationship between religion and politics, including reconciliation of the aspiration of Christians, Moslems anc others under a modern, democratic and constitutional political system.

o The problem of national identity and cultural and ethnic diversity and how to achieve peaceful coexistence within this diversity.

o Equitable participation in political and public affairs to ensure that the majority preserves the rights of the minority in this respect.

o Economic development based on the equitable distribution of resources and development opportunities.

A peaceful solution to the southern problem is feasible and possible. There is no real obstacle preventing the north and the south from finding political solutions based on mutual understanding and consent.

This study consists of eight chapters. The details are as follows:

Chapter Two: Geography, People and Ethnic Groups.

Chapter Three: The Origin of the Political Structure in Southern Sudan.

Chapter Four: The Mutiny of 1955 and Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972.

Chapter Five: Origin of the Second Civil War.

Chapter Six: The Impact and Effects of the War.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions.

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CHAPTER II

GEOGRAPHY, PEOPLE AND ETHNIC GROUPS

The discovery of Sudan's fascinating past is a long and complex story, still in progress and based on a multitude of written sources and archaeological researches. The oldest clues about Sudan were the records found in ancient Egyptian literature, but unfortunately these records hold very little ethnographical or geographical descriptions for the historians.

Bilad al Sudan[1] or "Land of the Blacks" was the term used by Arab geographers to describe the land lying south of the Sahara in Africa. Modern geographers use the term "Sudan" to describe the belt of dry Savanna and semi-desert areas stretching across the continent from east to west. The chief sources are Herodotus, Diodorus and Pliny The Elder. Rich data is found in the vivid writings of medieval Arab historians and geographers, notably, Ibn Selim, Ibn Kuldun and Al-Magrizi. It was the Turko-Egyptian invasion in 1821 which exposed the country to study by individual scholars and organized expeditions who assiduously recorded, measured, published and removed the visible antiquities along the Nile.

Sudan is Africa's largest country. It is nearly as large as Western Europe, or one-third the size of the United States. Sudan's geographical position at the crossroads of Africa has been dominant in directing the course of both its history and politics. This vast land of nearly one million square miles in size provided a meeting place for the Pharonic, Christian and Islamic civilizations and its indigenous civilization, such as that of Meroe, and witnessed the subsequent diffusion of a huge variety of cultures.

Sudan's vastness is matched by the diversity of climatic conditions. The country's ecological zones are determined by the amount of precipitation, ranging from the virtually rainless deserts in the far north, merging into

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semi-desert then low and high rainfall areas of the Savanna which meets first
swampy flood plains and finally, in the far south the rain forest. The
central areas are predominately extremely flat plains, but there are
significant mountain ranges in the east, the south and the west. The Nuba
mountains in the heart of the country rise above the plains and provide an
isolated habitat for some West African vegetation.

The Nile is the most outstanding physical feature of the land. It has two
main tributaries: The White and Blue Niles. The former flows from Lake
Victoria, while the later is from Lake Tana in Ethiopia.

The country can be divided into three climatic regions: north of latitude
19 degrees N. where a desert region is dominated by dry northerly winds
throughout the year and rainfall is rare. In winter the winds are high
causing sandstorms (haboobs). South of latitude 19 degrees is a region
influenced by the movement of the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone. The third
region is the Red Sea coast where the climate is open to maritime influences
and sea breezes and most rain falls in winter.

The Southern Sudan may be roughly defined as the region lying south of the
tenth parallel and extending to the north of Lake Albert in Uganda. It
consists of three provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. The
boundaries of the south are by no means ethnic boundaries. Some of the tribes
of the Southern Sudan, such as the Azande, the Acholi, the Latuka, the Turkana
and the Anuak spill over the borders into the neighboring countries. Some of
the tribes in the northern part of Upper Nile and Bahr al Ghazal provinces
likewise spill over the tenth parallel. The boundaries of the south are lines
drawn by a foreign power for political or administrative convenience.[2]

These physical and climatic conditions of the south have produced an
environment difficult to live in. It has on the other hand, produced a

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variety in the modes of living. At one extreme, there are those who live
through animal husbandry and at the other extreme those who live on crop
production. In every area, fishing, hunting, and gathering of wild vegetation
and fruits are subsidiary economic activities.

The People

There are two main physical types in the Sudan, the so-called Brown race
and the Negroid. The former, according to Arkell, is thought to have
originated from Arabia, various waves having left the Arabian Peninsula at
different times owing primarily to climatic change and periodical droughts
forcing the population to emigrate.[3]

Many of the so-called Arabs are Negroid in appearance, and some of the so-
called Negroes have non-Negroid features. Professor Seligman believes that
there is a foreign non-Negroid element in some of the tribes of the Southern
Sudan, such as the Shilluk. He holds that though this element may not be so
obvious in the Dinka and the Nuer, for example, there is no question that it
exists there too.[4] It is doubtful whether any people in the Sudan can be
regarded as true Negroes, and their non-Negroid characters, their pastoral
pursuits and, to a certain degree, the structure of their language are
attributed to Hamitic admixture and influence.[5]

He warns against the use of the term "Arab" in reference to racial
character. The term is used by anthropologists in a historic sense only.

The true Arabs have always been numerically insignificant, and wherever
they settled, they intermarried with the local people whether Nubians, Beja or
Negroids. The result of all this is the existence in the Sudan of today of
every conceivable degree of admixture between the Brown and the Negro and the
absence of a culture which can be described as a purely Arabic and Moslem. So

the term "Arab" has significance in a linguistic and cultural rather than in a racial sense.

The Southern Sudan, unlike the north, is culturally heterogeneous. Anthropologists have classified its people, according to their language, physical types and historical background, into three main groups:

o The Nilotics, comprising the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anuak, who mostly live in Bahr a Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces. Each of these consists of a number of tribes. They are agriculturists and cattle owners, depending on the environment.[6] Not only do cattle provide them with milk and furnish them with fuel, sleeping skins and other useful objects, but they also give them the means to marry and are the medium through which they maintain relations with the spirits and with the ghosts of their ancestors.[7]

The Dinka are considered the most sophisticated of the Nilotics, the Nuer are looked upon as the hardest to administer. The greater part of the Anuak live in Ethiopia.

o The Nilo-Hamitics, comprising the Murle, the Didinga, Boya, Toposa and Latuka who live mostly in Equatoria. Like the Anuak, they are not confined to Sudan, some of them living in Uganda and Kenya.

o The Sudanic tribes, comprising the small and numerous tribes living in the west and southwestern parts of the south. The most important member of the group is the Azande.

Other tribes such as the Bari, Mandari, Nyangwara, Fajulu, Muru and Luluba are admixtures of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic and Sudanic groups. None of these tribes is strong enough to act as a focus for others or capable of dominating or absorbing the other tribes.

Not all of these tribes have originated and lived all their life in the Southern Sudan. The Shilluk, according to Seligman, came to the south from

the east of Lake Victoria.[8] The Dinka are thought to have come from the

Great Lakes of East Africa while the Azande are thought to have come from

Central Africa in the 19th century, and the Sudanic people from near Lake Chad

in the 17th century.[9] These tribes , therefore, have no more claim to be

the original people of the Sudan than the Arab tribes who emigrated to the

north.[10]

The ethnic differences among tribes are reflected in language and

political and religious institutions. Though some of the languages spoken are

related to each other, others are isolated and little is known about a great

number of them. The main language groups, however, are the Nilotic languages

and their dialects, comprising Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Acholi and Burun; the

Bari group and its allied dialects comprising Bari and Latuka; the Didinga

group comprising Didinga and Tobosa; the Madi group comprising Madi and Muru;

the Azande and the western group comprising Mundi and Kreish.[11]

The Southern Sudan is not a homogeneous community and the factors which

contribute to the making of one nation are still lacking. The same cannot be

said about the north. Economic, political and social development and the

spread of Islam as a cultural uniting factor have contributed to the creation

of a homogeneous community.[12]

Internal migration and a common history for thousands of years has

contributed to the admixture of the people and the absence of a purely Arab or

Negro race. Hence the acceptance by the Sudanese that they are a mixture of

both. This, though it may correctly be regarded as an adequate ground for

claiming a special status for the south within the framework of united Sudan,

does not constitute a sound argument for the splitting of the Sudan into two

independent sovereign states. The modern state, especially in Africa, is not

and could not be founded on religious, racial or even cultural homogeneity.

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It is based, above all, on the community of interests and objectives of people who, different though they may be in certain respects, have met across continental and not merely tribal or regional boundaries. In the present age Africa, of which the Sudan constitutes an integral part and uniquely representative cross section, is moving towards unity and close association rather than in the direction of separation. The splitting of the Sudan into two or more states probably would not only be unnecessary and undesirable as a matter of principle; it would also have serious practical repercussions on Africa as a whole. In an age when the race question is becoming of increasingly great importance, it might, from a worldwide point of view, also be a most tragic event.[13]

ENDNOTES

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3. A. J. Arkell, A History of The Sudan. London, 1961, p. 22.

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CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Richard Gray observed that the 19th century societies of Southern Sudan
lacked any broad focus of authority. They were, in his view, in a state of
anarchy. Not only did they have "scanty technological equipment," but they
were also ignorant of commerce, had "minute social horizon," and lacked "any
broad political allegiance."[1] In the 1940's, a similar observation was made
by Evans-Pritchard and Fortes, in their collection of essays (African
Political Systems).[2] They believed that stateless, unlike centralized,
societies can boast no cultural achievements, have no stable political
organization, and above all, lack institutions for long-distance trade
contacts. Such a view of precolonial African societies has already proved
erroneous because some of the so-called segmentary or stateless societies have
been revealed as far more vigorous and stable than was earlier assumed.[3]

In spite of these advances in African historiography, such ideas still
persist with regard to the societies of Southern Sudan. How might this be
explained? Part of the answer lies in the fact that until now only a few
systematic historical studies have been undertaken on the precolonial history
of these communities. The result is that we know far too little of their
history. Indeed, for some of these societies we know next to nothing. Yet a
knowledge of this history is essential in the search for our cultural,
political and social roots.[4]

Professor Ali Mazrui has noted that "the most fundamental problems
confronting African countries are reducible to two crises: The crisis of
national integration, and the crisis of political legitimacy."[5] The Sudan

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is no stranger to these problems, although Arab culture, Islam and the Arabic language have provided a unifying element in the Northern Sudan.

Professor Mohammed Omer Beshir has noted that:

> The policy of the condominium administration regarding relations between the Northern and Southern Sudan - which came to be known as Southern Policy, and which was based on separate and different paths of development for the north and the south, had led to a delay in the rise and development of political movements in the south, relative to the north.6

The Southern Policy amounted to:

o All northern administrative staff transferred out of the southern provinces.

o Trading permits of the northerners in the south were withdrawn.

o Abolition of Arabic language; every administrator was instructed to speak the language of his district or at second best, English, but never Arabic.

o The wearing of Arab dress and usage of Arabic names by southerners were discouraged.

Political consciousness in the south remained weak, until the early 1940's. The first period of informal social association and embryonic economic and political organizations ended in 1947 the Year of the Juba Conference. The importance of the Juba Conference was that it was the first meeting in which the northerners and the southerners had met together to discuss the future constitutional and administrative relationship between north and south. It was also the first occasion when southerners from the three provinces had been consulted as a group on this future relationship. It provided the first opportunity for southern leaders to participate as individuals and jointly as a group in discussing the future of the south in relation to the political and administrative changes in Sudan.

The second participation came in December 1948 when thirteen southerners were appointed to represent the south in the Legislative Assembly. The total number in all for the Assembly was ninety-five of whom six were British. The agenda of the Legislative Assembly included the question of the future of the Sudan, economic, educational development and legislative matters. Their concern was no longer limited to the south only, but to the whole Sudan.

In 1951 the first political organization was formed in Juba (The Southern Party). In 1952 a political committee was set up in Juba, but it did not live long. In 1954 the Southern Party changed its name to the Liberal Party. The Liberal Party functioned as the only political organization in the south until 1958 when it was dissolved with all other political parties by the military regime of General Abboud.

The central point in the Liberal Party's program was federation, and to this end its leadership based its alliances with the then major political parties in the north: The Umma and The National Union Party (NUP). The Liberal Party devoted all its energies to obtaining a federal status for the south. It succeeded on 19 December 1955 in persuading the Parliament when making its resolution to declare the independence of the Sudan in January 1, 1956 to pass another resolution to the effect that the demand for federation would be given full consideration. In order to fulfill this aim and to serve the immediate demands of the south, the Liberal Party entered into coalitions with different parties at different times.

The era of southern involvement in national politics took an upward trend, and in 1958 when new elections were held, there was disillusionment with the old politicians. The 1958 elections brought to parliament a new type of southern politician, young, better educated and militant in his demand for federation. The phase which came to an end in November 1958 had witnessed one

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of the most important events in the north-south relationship and in the process of participation and involvement.

The policy of the Abboud Regime and its attitude towards the south led many southerners, especially students, politicians, administrators and ex-MPs afraid of being arrested, to flee the country in 1960. Those who fled the country started to organize themselves. In 1962 they created in Leopoldville, Congo, the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU). In 1963 the name was changed to the Sudan African National Union (SANU). Its headquarters were in Kampala, Uganda. From then on SANU began to seek and organize support inside and outside the Sudan.[7]

Meanwhile, the various groups of former soldiers and policemen who had been living in the bush since the 1955 mutiny continued to attack army and police posts from time to time, but they lacked organization and leadership. In 1963 these groups joined together under the name of Anya Nya and became the armed wing of SANU.

In 1965 the Azania Liberation Front (ALF) was formed. In 1966 there were further conflicts and divisions within ALF. In August 1967 a large meeting of southern political leaders outside the Sudan was held in secret in Angudri near the Congo (Zaire) border. At this time it was decided to dissolve all political groups and organization and establish the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG). Aggrey Jaden was appointed president, and a political bureau of fifteen members was formed. Later the Nile Provisional Government (NPG) was formed, and in 1969 General Taffeng declared his opposition to the (NPG) and formed the Anyidi State Government. In July 1970 Colonel Joseph Lagu, Eastern Commander of the Anya Nya forces, revolted against Taffeng and declared the formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).

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However, the same divisive forces which had led to the discontinuance of the previous political organizations and provisional governments soon appeared: tribalism, personal rivalries and disagreements over the distribution of foreign assistance and aid.[8]

The southern politicians outside the Sudan were described by Dunstan M. Wai as:

> Confused and having lost contact with the real issues involved in the North-South Conflict. Some of them have no keen interests in the Anya Nya and have even worked for the disunity of the Anya Nya to serve their own interests. Sheer personal ambition has led to power struggles resulting in internal divisions, thereby creating a meaningless government purporting to represent the southern Sudanese. Incompetence and lack of political foresight are common among them. They have refused to see the fact that they lack the ability to put political issues in proper perspective and have assumed certain positions of power which they are unable to shoulder. All these factions suffer from the lack of serious intention to serve the people they claim to lead, and egoistic pursuits occupy much of their time. The creation of the multiplicity of presidents was motivated by the struggle for financial help from their benefactors. Tribalism has also plagued all southern politicians outside the Sudan. I have already indicated that the formation of the Anyidi Revolutionary Government was basically tribally motivated and aimed at countering the Dinka dominance in the Nile Government. Another common element among them is that they fall under the category of ignorant elites.[9]

Similarly, in 1982, when launching the call for the redivision of the Southern Region, Joseph Lagu argued that tribalism was one of the main reasons why the south had to be decentralized--that is "to save the south from the institutionalized Dinka domination."[10]

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7. Ibid., p. 52.

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10. J. Lagu, Decentralization, 1982.

CHAPTER IV

THE MUTINY OF 1955 AND ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT IN 1972

The mutiny of Equatoria Corps on 18 August 1955 was a reaction against the
indifference of the northern political parties to the demands made by the
southern political leadership for federation, sometimes amounting to outright
rejection. The results of the Sudanization policy were disappointing to
educated southerners and were the direct reason for the mutiny.[1] The way
the mutiny broke out and the way it was suppressed marked the beginning of the
use of force to solve the problems of relations between the north and south.
Until then the problem had been left to the politicians to debate. "For the
first time since 1924 the 'soldier' became directly involved and active in the
field which had hitherto been considered the domain of politicians."[2]

The origin and causes of the mutiny have been recounted in detail in a
Government Report.[3] On the 8th of September the Minister of Interior
appointed a Commission of Enquiry to enquire into and report upon the recent
disturbances in Southern Sudan and their underlying causes.

On October 10, 1956 the Commission of Enquiry published its report. It
stated in the report that:

> The causes of the disturbances can never be understood
> unless the following points are constantly kept in mind:
> (1) There is very little in common between northern and
> southern; (2) For historical reasons the southerners
> regard the northern Sudanese their traditional enemies;
> (3) The British administrative policy until 1947 was to
> let the southern Sudanese progress on African and Negroid
> lines; (4) For political, financial, geographical and
> economical reasons the Northern Sudan progressed quickly
> in every field while the Southern Sudan lagged far behind;
> (5) All the above factors combined did not create in the
> southern Sudanese a feeling of common citizenship with the
> northern Sudanese, nor a feeling of nationalism or
> patriotism to the Sudan as a whole.[4]

The mutiny had resulted from fear, suspicion and past policies aimed at the creation of a constitutional collapse which in the case of federation not being granted, would lead ultimately to the separation of the south. Although this was not achieved at the time, the mutiny introduced a new factor in north-south relations: the use of violence and direct involvement of the military on both sides in the Southern Sudan problem.

Southern leadership grew with the expansion of education in the 1950's and during the early 1960's, and parties were formed by students and junior administrators who had fled abroad. Between the 1962-1964 SANU organized a guerrilla army out of the remnants of the 1955 mutineers and new student recruits. By 1964 the Anya Nya (named after a type of Moru poison) was active in Equatoria Province. In October 21, 1964 the military regime was overthrown, and SANU abandoned secession and returned to Sudan to become a legal party.

An all parties Round Table Conference was convened in 1965 to discuss the southern problems but it failed to agree on a formula. The main northern parties insisted on unitary national government with no single southern regional government. The southern parties wanted a united southern region which elected its own leader and had some control over finances and security. Northern and southern parties remained divided on these issues. In 1968 a constituent assembly was elected to draft a permanent constitution. The Umma, DUP and Moslem brothers were also committed to an Islamic state. Southern delegates walked out when it was clear that the Moslem majority in the assembly would not accept southern objections.

By 1969 the Civil War had escalated to all three provinces. The exile movement fragmented and guerrilla armies proliferated along ethnic lines. Douglas H. Johnson noted that:

> Some got funding from external church groups and foreign
> governments, especially Israel, Ethiopia and Uganda
> (following Idi Amin's Coup). It was largely through
> Israel's support that Joseph Lagu, a former army
> lieutenant, was able to pull together the disparate
> guerrilla bands, supplant the civilian exile leadership
> and form the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in
> 1970.[5]

Nimeiry's coup on May 25, 1969 dissolved the constituent assembly and

banned political parties. He proposed a secular, socialist state with

regional autonomy for the south, claiming that the Islamic state favored by

the main northern parties was detrimental to national unity. It was not until

1971, however, after a bloody confrontation with the Ansar Religious Sect

(associated with the Umma Party) and a near successful Communist coup, that

negotiations began between Nimeiry's government and the SSLM of Joseph

Lagu.[6]

THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT, 1972-1981

The Addis Ababa Agreement which ended the war in March 1972 led to the

formation of a southern regional government and was the first serious attempt

to give constitutional guarantees for institutionalized autonomy for the

south. In the absence of northern insistence on an Islamic state, the

negotiators were able to come to an agreement.

The agreement provided for a single southern region with a regional

assembly which elected a president for its own High Executive Council. The

HEC was responsible for internal administration and security, and the assembly

had legislative powers and the right to raise some of its own revenues. The

agreement also provided for the absorption of the guerrillas into the national

army, police and prison service.

> The full weight of the agreement came to rest on the
> working relationship between the president of the republic
> and the HEC. It was a relationship vulnerable to stresses
> at either end of Khartoum—Juba axis. In Khartoum
> Nimeiry had to contend with those who thought he had
> conceded too much to the south, while in Juba Abel Alier,
> the leader of the governments's negotiating team at Addis
> Ababa and the first president of the HEC, was accused of
> being too subservient to the north. Attempts by both
> presidents to meet the complaints of their critics
> weakened this one governmental link between the north and
> the south, imperiling the effectiveness of the entire
> agreement.[7]

During the period 1977-1980 the southern region was preoccupied with its

own internal divisions. The first government of Abel Alier made significant

progress in establishing the basic structures of government and

administration. Yet the pace of development did not meet expectation. Alier

was blamed for not pressing the south's case forcefully enough in Khartoum.

There emerged a feeling that those who had fought the struggle "outside" of

the Sudan were receiving fewer benefits of peace than those who had remained

"inside." It was this dissatisfaction which Joseph Lagu, now retired from the

army, focussed in the regional elections of 1978.

A certain mythology has grown up around "outsiders" and "insiders" in the

south, which has contributed to the current "Equatorian-Nilotic"

confrontation. "Outsiders" claim to have contributed most in the first war,

having either fought in the bush or gone into exile. "Insiders," who worked

through the internal parties are sometimes alleged to have collaborated with

the Khartoum government. Abel Alier, a Dinka, represented the "insiders,"

while Lagu, an Equatorian, represented the outsiders.

It is true that a number of AnyaNya soldiers and administrators did not

fare well in appointments and promotions in the army and civil administration.

Part of this was due to the high rate of retirement and dismissal of

ex-Any Nya officers in the army, over which the HEC had no control. The government also did not have enough jobs to give to the large numbers of ordinary ex-guerrillas. Abel Alier's supporters deserted him over this issue, and over the slow development in the south. There was a smooth constitutional transfer of power when the new regional assembly elected Joseph Lagu president in 1978.

Lagu was a popular orator but lacked administrative and political skills. He was unable to deal with the opposition in the assembly and antagonized many of his supporters. Nimeiry dissolved the regional assembly, declared new elections, and appointed an interim regional government.

Alier was elected for a second term by the new assembly in 1980. He appointed a large number of Dinka, including some of Lagu's former allies, to his new cabinet. Alier's government was marked by a more aggressive pursuit of regional autonomy and economic development when dealing with Khartoum. Nimeiry regarded this regional government as a threat and tried to neutralize it. In this he was helped by the disunity in the south. This second assault on the regional government was one of the reasons which led to the outbreak of the second civil war.

ENDNOTES

1. M. O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan, 1975, p. 49.

2. Ibid., p. 49.

3. Sudan Government: Southern Sudan Disturbances, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, Khartoum, 1955.

4. Bona Malwal, People and Power in Sudan, 1981, pp. 34-35.

5. Douglas H. Johnson, The Southern Sudan, The Minority Rights Group Report No. 78, 1988, p. 5.

6. Ibid., p. 5.

7. Ibid., p. 5.

CHAPTER V

ORIGINS OF THE SECOND CIVIL WAR

With the help of many people of good intent, Sudanese and non-Sudanese,
agreement was reached in Addis Ababa between the central government of the
Sudan on the one hand and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on the uther.

Full details of the implementation of this agreement over a ten-year
period and how and why Nimeiry came to abrogate it in 1983 are contained in a
longer study by Bona Malwal[1] currently in preparation. But the reader may
benefit here from a summary of what was actually contained in the 1972 Addis
Ababa Agreement and what has of late been flouted. The following were the
main items of the agreement:[2]

o The cultural identity of the south was recognized and the southern
legislative body was empowered to legislate on custom. The region's executive
institutions were also obligated to encourage and develop southern customs and
adjust them in the light of social changes in society.

o Arrangements were made governing the equality of citizens and
prohibiting discrimination on the bases of race, color, religion and other
factors. There are two main cultural axes in the country--broadly speaking
"African" and "Arab." Many religions and spiritual beliefs are professed and
practiced in addition to the two well-known faiths, Islam and Christianity.
In view of these diversities, it was agreed that a secular constitution would
guarantee equal opportunity to all citizens in their cultural, economic and
public life.

o The agreement provided for a southern regional legislative and
executive body--The High Executive Council--as well as for a regional civil
service. The legislative body was to be elected on the basis of one man, one
vote in a secret ballot. Power to nominate members to legislative body was

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granted to no one, not even the president of the Republic. This arrangement was made to guard the south's evolving democratic practice. It was also intended to guarantee a measure of independence to the regional institutions.

o In 1972 at Addis Ababa this vital southern position was accepted. The point is important, for it is expected to be very many years indeed before the president of the Sudan is likely to be a southern Sudanese.

o After any civil war, the issue of national security is bound to present many problems. It was therefore agreed in Addis Ababa that the armed forces stationed in the south were to be composed of 12,000 officers and men, 50 percent southern Sudanese and the other 50 percent drawn from other parts of Sudan. Police and prison services were to be recruited locally in the south and similarly enlisted, in the main, from the Anya-Nya forces. It was also agreed that the president of the HEC was to be an adviser to the president of the Republic on the deployment of national forces in the south. This has been shelved.

o Financial considerations were of course fundamental, the southern Sudan having been left by its former British rulers with hardly any schools, hospitals, roads, modern commerce or trained manpower. It was thus essential to agree on a crash economic program to pull the south out of its state of poverty and socioeconomic underdevelopment. This has been one of the broken promises.

o Moreover, that agreement, it had been decided, could only be changed by a decision of a three-quarters majority of the members of the National Assembly, provided that such a resolution was subsequently supported by two-thirds majority of the people of Southern Sudan voting in a plebiscite. So when the president, by decree in June 1983, sought to divide the south, he did

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so in disregard of the provisions of the agreement. The National Assembly had not and has not made a resolution to divide the south, nor has any plebiscite been conducted in the Southern Sudan.

Bona Malwal, one of Nimeiry's ministers for ten years, has noted that:

> The passing years have revealed Nimeiry's ulterior motives for initially agreeing to a south central government settlement. He has progressively revealed his real intentions towards the south year after year, and many southerners have indeed begun to feel that Nimeiry even deliberately planned to appoint Abel Alier as head of the delegation to Addis Ababa in order to deceive the south. 'Southerners negotiated among themselves and should now take their agreement and eat it,' is often quoted because Nimeiry has made it crystal clear that he is absolutely resolved to abrogate the 1972 Agreement with the south.[3]

The Addis Ababa agreement included provision for integrating the Anya Nya fighters in the People's Armed Forces. It provided for the number of fighters to be incorporated and the period for completing such incorporation. It also provided for the type of government for the south and for its relationship with the central government in Khartoum. Those provisions were the causes for renewal of the fighting and the emergence of Anya Nya II and, in particular, the mutiny of Battalion 105 in Bor. This sparked the new rebellion.

There are those who are of the opinion that the agreement was concluded and signed hastily, and was not preceded by a dialogue of the type that is being conducted in 1989.[4] Provisions of the agreement lacked precision and overlooked certain important issues such as the transfer of troops between various regions of the country and the unification of such troops. Others thought that the former president was not serious about implementing the agreement or that, at least, he did not respect its provisions in the light of his powers that consolidated the presidential system in the Sudan, in general, and the parliamentary system in the south in particular. Some northerners and

southerners regard the period of the rule of President Gaafar Nimery as characterized by a number of errors that could be specified as follows:[5]

o The decision to integrate the Anya Nya I jungle fighters was not done in a satisfactory manner, and the agreement did not provide for the transfer of troops, after the five-year period, to various regions of the north. Fighters who were appointed to other jobs were dismissed a few months later. This created an army of unemployed former guerrilla fighters. This had a negative impact, and such disgruntled persons were potential recruits for the rebel forces.

o The agreement provided for effecting radical changes in the social and economic structures through expansion of the construction of development projects and the exploitation of natural resources. Planned projects such as the Mangala and Malut Sugar Factories, Aiwel Rice Project, Kapoita Cement Project, Tong Kenaf Project, Rehabilitation of the Azande Project and the Coffee and Tea Projects were neglected and have not been implemented up to the present day.

o The decision to construct the Jongli Canal without consultation of the indigenous inhabitants raised fear among those citizens for it would lead to great change in the ecology and means of livelihood in the area.

o The decision to change plans and construct the Oil Refinery in Kosti instead of Bantu, where the oil was discovered, raised many suspicions. These were further strengthened by differences over the areas of Hofrat Al Nihas and Kafi Kinji. A crisis developed over the borders of the southern region.

o The promulgation of the Sudan Penal Code 1983 led to a feeling of disregard for the rights of Christians. That code included provisions from Islamic Hudud which were applied on a number of non-Moslems. The feeling was

that those provisions were imposed on non-Moslems in disregard of their beliefs and customs.

There is no consensus of opinion on the interpretation of those incidents. Reactions thereto have been tainted with suspicions, the factor of distrust added new dimensions. For instance, the redivision of the south has been considered by some people as the doing of Equatorians who complained of the ethnic superiority and domination by the Dinka tribes. They tried to find in redivision a way out. The transfer of the Oil Refinery, according to some people, should not have given rise to frictions if the discovered oil was considered as belonging to the whole of the Sudan just like other national schemes in the country. The September 1983 laws ought not, according to a different point of view, to have given rise to those violent campaigns had they not been exploited by some foreign and domestic elements. In any case those laws were never applied to the provinces of the south. Additionally, those enactments were passed after the mutiny of Battalion 105 in Bor. Some citizens have declared their total rejection of any laws other than those of Sharia which they accepted and did not impose on others.

Regardless of the differences of opinions associated with the interpretation of those incidents, there is no doubt that Southern Sudan, for different historical, geographical and political reasons, has remained under-developed, and characterized with great diversity in religious and ethnic groups.

THE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL 1985-1986 (TMC)

In response to mass demonstrations in Khartoum, Nimeiry was removed in April 1985 by the Minister of Defense, General Suwar Al-Dahab, who formed a Transitional Military Council and appointed a civilian cabinet composed of

politicians and trade union leaders. The problem of the south had already reached an unprecedented degree of complication. The SPLA/SPLM escalated the war in a sharp manner which plundered most of the country's resources. Political parties were allowed to organize freely, and in addition to the traditional parties, several new parties were formed in the nation's capital and in the south, east and west.[6]

The SPLA refused to recognize the TMC, claiming that it was a continuation of Nimeiry's military high command.[7] The SPLA/SPLM also refused to take part in the proposed national elections until a new constitutional formula for the country had been agreed. It did, however, agree to a dialogue with the trade unions and political parties, who together formed the National Alliance which had forced Nimeiry's removal. General elections were conducted. Negative effects on the Constituent Assembly were apparent. Armed conflict was intensified and, for the first time, extended to areas such as the Nuba Mountains and southern Kordofan.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES 1986-1989

The mistakes of the National Government during this period were due to the multi-party political system and to the rivalries for widening support for the respective political parties so as to form majority governments regardless of the identity of the ministerial formula, or coalition, and the elements of agreement or discord in policies and objectives. Hence, majority governments necessarily included southern political parties whether those were governments of national consensus, national unity or a united national front. And the problem of the south remained a source for personal glory and personal gains. This caused the will of the nation to weaken and disintegrate even on fundamental national issues. Rounds of negotiations inspired by specific

partisan stands, and peace initiatives which were accepted or rejected on the basis of political intrigues and partisan jealousies, and the winning of allies, were evidence of the fragility of the national will.[8] Samples of this indecisiveness were demonstrated in Koka Dam, Burger, Ambo and the 16th of November Peace Initiative. They reflected the absence of a uniform Sudanese will. Those governments have overlooked and played down the serious incidents of Babanousa and Al Diain in Western Sudan. This exposed the country to aggressive and unfavorable campaigns. Such campaigns were further intensified by unfounded reports about slavery in the country. This, in turn, was used to excite new racism. Those governments have also helped in raising militia forces that were deployed for exerting pressure and practicing robberies and pillage in contingent zones. Prior to that, those areas were places of peaceful existence between various tribes and groups.

THE FOREIGN INTERFERENCES AND PRESSURES

Developing countries have been facing heavy pressures since the late 1970's. Such pressures take various forms, but the most effective one is the imbalance in the world economy. This now constitutes a real crisis since dialogue has vanished between the affluent northern and deprived southern parts of the world. This imbalance, or defect, in the world economy has been followed by political pressures whether concealed under humanitarian and charitable labels or exposed in the form of ideologies. For that reason the world has become spheres of influence divided by agreement in a way that preserves the balance of power and allocates areas whether they be warm seas, strategic zones or natural resources. These international pressures have played major roles in the conflict in the Southern Sudan. We can observe features and effects of that in the following:

o Neighboring countries, with their different political systems and ideological orientations, have been the main bases for harboring hostile activity whether through the supply of arms, training or the provisions of camps and other material and moral support.

o Some of the neighboring countries exploit the rebellion in the Sudan in order to arrive at agreements that would help them to settle their own domestic conflicts, or they play host to the rebels and thereby obtain substantial assistance from a major power supporting the rebellion in the Sudan.

o Some big financial organizations and corporations look at areas of conflict as lucrative markets for the sale of arms which has developed into a profitable international trade.

o Some organizations and corporations are quite aware of the great mineral reserve wealths of the Southern Sudan together with the region's vast and unexploited agricultural lands. They look at this area from the point of view of their interest and potential investments. They plan that their support of the rebellion now would give them preferential or priority treatment in future investments in that region.

o Rivalries for ideological influence are still rampant regardless of detente, and ideologies aspire to gaining areas of influence for spreading their way of thinking and forms of government.

o There are some voluntary and charitable organizations which are, in fact, arms of foreign intelligence agencies and which, under a humanitarian mask, tend to frustrate all human endeavors.[9]

o There are Sudanese groups, parties or political entities that use foreign pressure to achieve their political objectives by "internationalizing" the conflict. Such tactics may appear as rejection of the September 1983

Sharia Laws, or advocacy of a particular ideology and form of government, or for creating a prominent status in the social and political domain. Those foreign sources would act as agents or sponsors for the Sudanese groups in question.[10]

Foreign interference was evident and effective. Without such interference and intervention the rebel movement would not have been able to possess rockets, anti-tank missiles, aeroplanes and modern arms, and would not have been able to have access to international forums, or to possess broadcasting stations and make great use thereof.

The root causes of the problem have intertwined and have penetrated deeply in the soil of distrust. Various factors have contributed to the development of those causes. Some of them relate to the ancient, middle, or modern history, or to the environment, as well as to the recent emergence of the Sudan as one state. This state has not yet grown into a nation with one fabric having the same customs or beliefs. In addition, for administrative and political mistakes, and the reprehensible objectives of previous professional politicians and their exploitation of the conflict for personal, partisan or tribal gains, the conflict escalated. There were also the colonial heritage of the past and recent foreign interventions in various forms. There was the lack of a scientific approach, or methodology, for handling the conflict through serious constructive dialogue which analyzes the various aspects of the conflict including issues of identity, sharing of power and realization of balanced development in all parts of the country.

ENDNOTES

1. Bona Malwal, The Sudan-A Second Challenge to Nationhood, 1985, p. 17.
2. Ibid., pp. 17-20.

3. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 21.

4. The Steering Committee on National Dialogue on Peace Issues, September 9 - October 1989, pp. 18-19.

5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 19.

6. Douglas H. Johnson, <u>The Southern Sudan</u>, The Minority Rights Group Report No. 78, p. 8.

7. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 8.

8. The Steering Committee on National Dialogue on Peace Issues, p. 23.

9. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 25.

10. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 25.

CHAPTER VI

THE IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF THE WAR

In considering the destructive impacts of war on man, infrastructure,
surrounding environments and social setups, I was able to come out with the
following statistics.[1] In human casualties we have lost 4,593 martyrs from
the armed forces and 2,595 civilians. The rebels have lost 27,733. The
number of the war victims who perished as a result of famine, illness and lack
of food amounts to 259,000 bringing the total number of the war victims to
293,921. In the field of weapons, equipments, vehicles, planes and
ammunitions, the losses on the part of both the armed forces and the rebel
forces were terrifying. Development in agricultural and industrial areas was
brought to a complete halt. This resulted in the loss of revenue expected
from hundreds of thousands of hectares and from many important factories which
ceased to function. The losses suffered as a result of the suspension of oil
prospecting operations between 1986-1989 were estimated to be around three
billion U.S. dollars. The work on the Jongli Canal was suspended in February
1983 after 51 percent of the actual digging was done. The costs of
prospecting till that date were around 300 million U.S. dollars. This
constituted a great loss and deprived the country of an ideal exploitation of
huge amounts of water.

The statistics also showed that the loss in the field of animal resources
is approximately seven million heads, a very tragic loss in a place like the
Southern Sudan where people are socially and economically closely attached to
their animal wealth. On the question of government expenditure the studies
conducted indicated that the costs of the war are 2.4 billion Sudanese pounds
a year or $11 million per day. Additional emergency expenditures had effected

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around a 750 million pounds increase in Chapter One in the 1989-1990 budget of the southern regions.

All these have produced a negative impact on the national economy of the whole country and accelerated its systematic deterioration which resulted in repeated devaluations and a series of setbacks in the development process and the flow of services throughout the country. On the other hand, the political effects of the war had negative repercussions demonstrated in the disintegration of the internal front. At the external level, the political and diplomatic work has undergone confusion especially in the fields of good neighborliness, regional cooperation, Afro-Arab cooperation and aid solicitation for the development of the Sudan. As a result of the effects of war on education and public services, all nine post-secondary institutes in the south closed their doors. The University of Juba--the only one in the south--faced numerous difficulties which led to its transfer to Khartoum.

In the area of general education, it transpired that 977 elementary schools closed down and only 174 are open at the moment. One hundred forty-eight intermediate schools ceased to function and only 51 are still open. Thirty-five secondary schools were shut down and only 14 are open. Eight institutes for teacher training stopped working and only four are still open, whereas three vocational, industrial and commercial schools were shut down and only one is operative these days. All these schools and institutions were either physically destroyed or deserted by the tens of thousands of students who fled to the other regions of the Sudan.

In the area of health facilities, 26 hospitals were closed down and only six are providing very limited health care. Tens of clinics and medical units in southern Kordofan and Southern Sudan stopped. All the war-affected regions lost a good number of their qualified medical personnel and suffered from

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severe shortages of medications. The losses in the social fields were quite

enormous. Approximately one-half million Sudanese citizens fled their homes

to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Three and one-half million either

headed towards some of the major cities in the south itself and the northern

regions or, as the majority did, arrived at the national capital Khartoum.

This phenomenon of displaced persons has precipitated various negative aspects

including family disintegration, social and moral deviations, psychological

distresses, homelessness and idleness, especially among the youth of the

displaced.

ENDNOTES

1. Final Report and Recommendation for the Steering Committee for
National Dialogue on Peace Issues, 1989, pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The historical background of the conflict in the Southern Sudan was discussed within the framework of the following six premises:

o Social and cultural structures of the Sudanese communities, their basic features and historical developments.

o The all-Sudanese state, its recent birth and emergence and its limited ability to achieve national unity and socioeconomic development.

o The colonial southern policy and its impact.

o The national governments and regimes, their policies and their weaknesses.

o Foreign intervention and pressure.

o The weakness of national development and deterioration of public services.

On considering the cultural and social structures, their basic features and their historical development, we concluded that Sudan with its geographical situation and the lack of transportation and communication facilities between northern and southern parts, has become one of the most diversified countries in the African continent in terms of climate, ethnic groups and cultures. This diversification is less sharp in the northern regions due to the widespread prevalence of Islam and the Arabic language among the population in those regions. It would have, therefore, been natural for cultural intermixing and integration between the south and the north to have gained more ground had it not been for the colonialist policy which encouraged the establishment of two heterogeneous identities which constituted the root cause of the problem.

Development is an essential issue in the present conflict in Southern
Sudan and in the deterioration of conditions in the various parts of the
country. But development was not considered with the appropriate attention or
within the correct philosophical framework which would render it focal in
national thought.

Religion was, and will continue to be, the source of benevolence,
tolerance, compassion and belief among individuals and groups. What
discriminates and causes destruction and changes religion into tools of
disruption and damage is intolerance and bigotry, whether on the side of
Moslems, Christians or others.

As to Arabism which is used to refer to the majority of the people of the
Sudan, together with many other African countries, it is not a racial tie that
connects the individuals of a certain ethnic group. It is a linguistic,
cultural and non-racial tie that engulfs many races and ethnic groups. These
include black, white and brown people. If Arabism was other than that, then
it would not include many of today's Arabs in both Asia and Africa as well as
all the inhabitants of the Sudan. On the other hand, Africanism is a
geographic, political and non-racial link that comports within it the
inhabitants of the African Continent in their diverse races, colors and
languages, including Negroes, Berbers and Arabs.

Concerning the destructive impacts of war on man, infrastructure,
surrounding environments and social setups, we were able to come out with
statistics for the great losses from both sides, beside the losses in the
field of animal resources, education, health and social and moral deviations.

The issue of the slave trade, whatever historical justifications it had,
and regardless of the participation of many quarters therein, whether

colonialism, the north or citizens of all south, has been and will continue to

be forever the most atrocious practice ever known in history. The issue of

ethnic superiority, however suppressed or concealed under comic or teasing

remarks in the north, or resorted to for securing control of some tribes in

the south by other tribes of the same region, is a symbol of underdevelopment

that should be discouraged and condemned.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATION

For a better perception and understanding of the recommendation I had to draw attention to the following:

o The core of the conflict in Southern Sudan and the rest of the regions is the issue of development which itself never enjoyed stability since independence of the country because development as a strategic goal never received the necessary plans for its execution.

o Religion has always been a source of welfare, tolerance, love and unity, and so whatever divides by converting such a role to one of sabotage and destruction is intolerance whether coming from Moslems, Christians or others.

o The development of local cultures, languages and dialects should also facilitate the establishment of bridges of communication and understanding within national or local channels. The development of education on the basis of these characteristics should receive proper attention as major concerns of the country.

o The issue of governing in the Sudan is an issue of participation in the decisionmaking and active involvement in the running of the government affairs in accordance with justice and equality.

o Balanced information that perceives the characteristics of the Sudanese society and reflects them in a just and honest manner is a cornerstone for the realization of integration and putting an end to years of pain, creating thereby a harmonious and advanced nation.

o The spread of corruption throughout vital institutions and at all levels of leadership has led to a state of frustration which in turn brought

about loss of hope for a better future. This provided a permanent source for recruitment to join the rebellion.

o Dialogue is an authentic Sudanese value; its call and appeal could not remain unanswered, its conclusions are always founded in this richness of culture, experience and knowledge.

THE OPTIONS OR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Sharing of Power

A complete change from Regional administration in Sudan to the Federal System with its federal organs.

Sharing of National Revenue

The economic and social disparity is one of the important causes of discontent and injustice among the people of the less-developed regions. It is essential for the new Federal Government to help to promote development all over the Sudan in accordance with the following guidelines:

o The state shall lay down a comprehensive economic and social plan to develop the country and to bridge the gaps between the various regions.

o Big development projects, whether agricultural or industrial, should be established and managed on a national basis.

o Big mining projects, like oil and others, shall be considered as national wealth for the benefit of the whole country.

o To establish branches for development corporations and public sector specialized banks in the less-developed regions.

o The state shall endeavor to strengthen the infrastructure on which the economy of the country depends, with emphasis on the building of interstate highways and improvement of the means of transport and communication.

o To train and qualify citizens from the less-developed regions to manage economic and social development projects by allotting them a fair share of chances in the Federal Educational and Training Institutions.

o To strengthen the national and regional economic planning organs, and grant them the powers and facilities to cope with their work.

The Cultural Diversity

Cultural, language, historical and environmental diversity is a factor of strength in the Sudan. The plans of education, information and culture should approach this diversity with tolerance and efficiency--in order to assimilate and express it in a comprehensive Sudanese cultural context.

Culture

The Federal State has a very important role in cultural revival and should seriously give consideration to cultural diversity and direct its cultural agencies:

o To provide finance and efficiency to cultural projects which are initiated by the individuals and societies, especially those proposed by various Sudanese groups to develop their dialects or to collect or display their heritage.

o To build national cultural institutions to display and reflect our rich diversity.

Identity

The Sudanese people are one nation, and like other nations they are a blend of diverse ethnic groups and cultures. After confirming these diverse realities of the Sudan, it is essential to emphasize the connection of the Sudanese citizens with the Sudanese nationality--which represents the sum

total of its various environments, cultures and ethnic groups in a united framework.

Arabism and Africanism are two important factors in the formation of the Sudan. They embody many geographical, political and cultural significances which overlap and influence each other greatly.

The State and Religion

Belief in religion forms a basic factor in the Sudanese fabric and culture. Islam is the religion of the majority of the population, and Christianity and African creeds are professed by a considerable number among them. The state and society are obliged to respect religions, tend for their rights and be guided by their tolerant teachings in close observance at the following principles:

o Freedom of belief and worship shall be guaranteed to all Sudanese.

o Freedom of Daawa and preaching shall be guaranteed for all Sudanese, provided no provocation shall be made to others.

o Sharia and custom shall be the two main sources of legislation in the Sudan.

o Sudanese are equal in rights and duties before the law. No distinction or discrimination shall be made between citizens because of their religion, ethnic origin or sex.

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